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Articles

I

Some Realism About Reorganization:
Explaining the Failure of Chapter 11
Theory
Stephen J. Lubben*
I.

Introduction

Almost since the day of its enactment; Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code1 has been the subject of a bevy of
* LL.M. Harvard Law School, 2000. J.D. Boston University School of Law,
1996. B.A. University of California, Irvine, 1993. I am extremely indebted to
Elizabeth Warren and Jennifer Ruth Hoyden for their help with this paper. This
paper also benefited from discussions I had with Reinier Kraakman while in
residence at Harvard. Richard Levin and Q.S. Kaye provided helpful comments.
Comments are invited, and can be directed to me by e-mail at
sjl@post.harvard.edu.
The reader should be advised that I am presently employed as an associate in
the corporate restructuring department of a leading New York-based law firm. I
represented a party in interest in certain of the cases cited herein, but all
information contained in this article is based solely upon publicly available
material. The opinions expressed in this article are my own, and must not be taken
to reflect the opinions of my employer or any current or former client.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994).
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law review articles urging either its drastic overhaul or complete

repeal.2 The salvos only increased with the recession of the early
nineties, and the resulting boom in Chapter 11 filings. Leading
scholars from virtually every major law school, typically
approaching the debate from a law and economics perspective,
have taken aim at Chapter 11 for over twenty years now.' Their

efforts have failed.
Chapter 11, by and large, remains unchanged since its
The only significant change to the statute that
enactment.4

Congress has seriously considered in recent years turns on whether
or not Delaware should lose its privileged status as the home to

most very large Chapter 11 cases

Proposals to dramatically

revamp Chapter l's structure, or to repeal Chapter 11 in order to
encourage more liquidations, have had little discernable effect.
To be sure, the critics of Chapter 11 have not promulgated
their views without remark; numerous scholars have argued that a
pure efficiency analysis-especially when efficiency is equated with
near effortless debt collection-undervalues the larger policies
behind reorganization of corporate debtors.6 The efficiency critics
2. E.g., Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing
Corporationsin Bankruptcy, 111 YALE L.J. 83 (2001); Barry E. Adler, A Theory of
Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343 (1997); Philippe Aghion et al., The
Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 523 (1992); Douglas G.
Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1987)
[hereinafter Baird, World Without]; Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for
Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986) [hereinafter Baird,
Corporate Reorganizations]; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A New
Approach to the Valuation of Assets in Bankruptcy, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2386
(2001); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to CorporateReorganizations,101
HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The
Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992); Mark J. Roe,
Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 527 (1983).
3. See supra note 2.
4. The current Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978. The best account of
the early bankruptcy laws in this country remains C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935).
5. Cf. Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An
Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of
Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: EmpiricalEvidence of
a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001); Robert K. Rasmussen &
Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race: A Comment on the Effects of the
Delawarizationof CorporateReorganizations,54 VAND. L. REV. 283 (2001).
6. Elizabeth Warren has been the most prominent member of this group of
scholars. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775,
788 (1987) ("Congress intended bankruptcy law to address concerns broader than
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of Chapter 11 have more often than not simply deflected these
criticisms by either proclaiming that the proponents of nonefficiency concerns bear the burden of justifying inclusion of these
factors in the analysis of the statute,' or by asserting that nonefficiency concerns belong to the realm of non-bankruptcy law.8
The heretics disarmed, the critics return to the quixotic task of
heralding Chapter l's inadequacies to a world that does not seem
to be listening.
Why the extreme disconnect between theory and reality?9 In
this article I argue that some of the harshest critics of Chapter 11

exhibit little understanding of the complex financial structure that
even a modestly large debtor typically possesses. This lack of
understanding has led the critics of Chapter 11 to propose

bankruptcy theories that suffer from serious technical

and

conceptual problems that call into question the utility of these
theories.
On one hand, the statute's critics are clearly tapped into at
least the basics of finance theory, as taught in law schools and the
early days of business schools, but, on the other hand, the same
authors show little understanding of the complex nature of

corporate finance in the messy world of firms on the brink of
financial collapse.

Thus the critics of Chapter 11 have failed to

move beyond the firm of textbook hypotheticals-where all firms
the immediate problems of debtors and their identified creditors; they indicate
clear recognition of the larger implications of a debtor's wide-spread default and
the consequences of permitting a few creditors to force a business to close.");
Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J.
437, 478 (1992) [hereinafter Warren, Untenable Case]. Lynn LoPucki has also
played a key role, not only by providing important empirical evidence that has
often reshaped the debate, see, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 (1993), but also by probing the viability of
some of the leading reform proposals, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Contract
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE L.J. 317 (1999) [hereinafter
LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy]; Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange
World: A Reply to ProfessorsBradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79 (1992)
[hereinafter LoPucki, Strange Visions].
7. Adler, supra note 2.
8. Baird, World Without, supra note 2, at 174.
9. My goal is not to add my voice to the chorus decrying abstraction in legal
literature. I accept that a good portion of the articles published in law reviews
today, especially those written by tenured professors, do not aim to affect policy in
any direct manner, but are instead part of an ongoing theoretical debate among
the law school sages. All the same, when a debate completely loses it mooring in
reality-as I argue the debate over Chapter 11 theory has-it risks losing any
vestige of significance.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:2

are comprised of three classes of claimants: senior creditors, junior
creditors, and equity-to the real world in which even a holding
company can have over a dozen classes of claimants.1"
The failure to connect theories developed in a world populated
by purely hypothetical firms to a more complex reality has lead to
the production of concepts that have little import beyond academia.
This failure has lead to the continued production of theories that
remain "almost defiantly far removed from reality."11
In Part II of this article, I briefly summarize and critique three
leading proposals for reforming corporate reorganizations. 2 This
part of the article demonstrates how leading articles by Professors
Bebchuk,"3 Schwartz, 4 and Adler 5 reflect little appreciation of how
debtors are financed, and the reasons for this financing. 6 In Part
III, I then extrapolate a general critique of reorganizational theory
from these and other leading Chapter 11 reform projects. 7 In Part
IV, I ultimately conclude that, while it should be possible to support
an efficiency based conception of corporate reorganization, the
attempts to do so to date suffer from identifiable internal and
external weaknesses that doomed them from their inception.
My point is not to uniformly reject the use of societal efficiency
as a basis for examining corporate reorganization or to defend the
current state of Chapter 11. There is clearly much room for
improvement, and certainly some previous articles proceeded in the
mistaken belief that identification of the diverse congressional
policies currently encased within the Bankruptcy Code serves as a
justification for the presence of these policies in the Code. In short,
rather than attempting an assault on any particular view of Chapter
11, the main function of this article is to emphasize the
shortcomings in one potentially promising view of Chapter 11.

10. E.g., Debtor's Mem. in Supp. of Confirmation of Plan of Reorganization
In re Home Holdings, Inc., No. 98-B-40319 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (on file with
author) (debtor's memorandum in support of confirmation of plan, which
describes a plan of reorganization with eleven primary classes, with class four
divided into five sub-classes).
11. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Searching for
Reorganization Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1287 (1994).
12. See discussion infra Part II.
13. See discussion infra Part II.A.
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.
15. See discussion infra Part II.C.
16. See supra notes 15-17.
17. See discussion infra Part III.
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Three Specific Conceptions of Chapter 11

Western jurisprudence has a long history of criticism based
upon revealing the unrealistic facets of any given theory. This
article joins in that tradition and extends it to bankruptcy. 18 This
section of the article examines the specific failings of three leading
Chapter 11 reform proposals: Lucian Bebchuk's option-based
approach, 9 Alan Schwartz's contract theory approach, 0 and Barry
Adler's "Chameleon Equity" approach.2" The goal is to illustrate
the significant problems with the leading theories, and the

multitude of issues that remain unaddressed, without retreading
ground that has been covered in the substantial body of academic

literature on this subject.
Professor Bebchuk's proposal was chosen because it is one of
the few systems that purports to be applicable within the existing
Chapter 11 framework.22 It has inspired other authors to offer
refinements of Bebchuk's original structure,' and he has continued
to refine the proposal himself.2' The other two works are more
radical: Professor Adler's "Chameleon Equity" system would

require major amendments to a host of non-bankruptcy law, and
Professor Schwartz's system would require all creditors of a firm to

consider their bankruptcy preferences at the point of first
interaction with the debtor. Taken together, these three articles
represent the state of the art in academic conceptions of corporate
reorganization.

18. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 662-63 (1958); see also
Stephen J. Lubben, Chief Justice Traynor's Contract Jurisprudenceand the Free
Law Dilemma: Nazism, the Judiciary, and California's Contract Law, 7 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 81 (1998) (discussing the German Free Law Movement).
19. See supra note 13.
20. See supra note 14.
21. See supra note 15.
22. See supra note 13.
23. See Aghion et al., supra note 2, at 539.
24. E.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate
Bankruptcy, 44 Eur. Econ. Rev. 829 (2000) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Using Options];
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Chapter 11, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/6 4 73 (Mar 1998) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Chapter 11].
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A. Lucian Bebchuk, "A New Approach to Corporate
Reorganizations"25
Under Professor Bebchuk's Chapter 11 reform proposal, each
of the debtor's claimants would be granted a transferable option on
the debtor.26 The option would entitle the holder to buy a portion
of all higher priority claims or interests, with the lowest priority
claimants having the first opportunity to exercise their options.27 If
the members of every tranche of debt and equity failed to exercise
their options, the highest priority claimants would obtain ownership
of the debtor.
Bebchuk illustrates his proposal through a simple example of a
company with an overall value (V) that is unknown. 29 The debtor
has three levels of claimants: Class A includes 100 senior creditors,
each owed $1; Class B includes 100 junior creditors, each owed $1;
Class C includes 100 shareholders, each holding one unit of equity.30
Each Class A creditor receives one type-A option right.31 The
company may redeem a type-A right for $1.12 If the right is not
redeemed, its holder will be entitled to receive one unit of the
reorganized company (RC).33 Each Class B creditor will receive a
type-B right.34 The debtor may redeem a type-B right for $1.3 If

the right is not redeemed, its holder will have the option to
purchase one RC unit for $1.36 Each Class C shareholder will
receive one type-C right.37 The company may not redeem a type-C
right.38 The holder of a type-C right will have the option to
purchase one RC unit for $2." Thus, beginning with the lowest
priority claimants, each class has the opportunity to either buy out
the senior classes, or forgo any recovery from the debtor.40 If the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1998).
Id. at 781-88.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 781-82.
Id. at 786.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 786-88.
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most senior class is not "bought out," it obtains ownership of the
debtor. 1
This option ladder is designed to avoid the need to value the
debtor, which Bebchuk describes as the most significant problem of
Chapter 11.2 No particular value is needed. Instead, creditors and
shareholders receive a recovery that reflects their claims as a
function of V.43 Creditors lacking the liquidity or desire to
participate in the reorganized company can sell their options to
third parties."
Bebchuk argues that it is highly unlikely that only a fraction of
any class of options would be exercised, because "in the presence of
market trading, the rights should all end up at the hands of the
optimists, who would use them; no rights would remain idle in the
hands of pessimists to whom the rights are of no use."45 Bebchuk
does not explain why the optimists would want to obtain all of the
RC units of the reorganized debtor, when a simple majority of the
units would apparently suffice.' Even at a nominal price, buying
excessive options would appear to be irrational. Moreover, in the
presence of heterogeneous valuations, once an optimistic party had
obtained a majority position in a class, the remaining rights could
well decline precipitously in value, to the point that only the
majority stake would be tendered."
The potential for partial redemptions of options exposes
Bebchuk's theory to the need to value the debtor, the very problem
that the theory was designed to avoid. Bebchuk explains that,
assuming partial redemption of options could occur, "money
received from the exercise of type-C rights will be used half for pro
rata redemption of type-A rights and half for pro rata redemption
of type-B rights."" Class A creditors, however, can be expected to
argue that this distribution does not satisfy their claims in full, and
that they are therefore entitled to some portion of Class B's
41. Id. at 787.
42. Id. at 777-81.
43. See id. at 784-85.
44. Id. at 786.
45. Id. at 788 n.33.
46. Bebchuk also argues that no type-C rights would be purchased if type-B
rights remain available, id., but type-C rights are the only rights that fully ensure
control over the reorganized debtor, as they are not redeemable by the debtor. Id.
at 786. Thus, if the purchaser strongly values control-perhaps as a result of the
presence of large private benefits-C-type rights may be more valuable than Btype rights.
47. Id. at 803; Roe, supra note 2, at 575.
48. Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 788.
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distribution. This problem is not solved by giving all of the cash to
Class A, because the RC units still need to be distributed between
Class A and B.
A short example illustrates the point. Consider a firm with a
capital structure only slightly different from that discussed by
Bebchuk:49 Class A includes 200 senior creditors, each owed $1;
Class B includes 100 junior creditors, each owed $1; Class C
includes 100 equity holders, each holding one unit of equity.
Assume that a party, utilizing the market for options that Bebchuk
envisions, obtains a majority (51) of the Class C options. This party
tenders these options, paying the reorganized firm the requisite $3
per RC unit in the new entity. No other party tenders option rights.
The reorganized firm thus has $153 in cash, and 49 remaining
RC units, to distribute to Classes A and B. At this point, it seems
plain that Bebchuk's assertion that "money received from the
exercise of type-C rights will be used half for pro rata redemption
of type-A rights and half for pro rata redemption of type-B rights"
would violate the absolute priority rule, as Class A is entitled to full
payment before Class B receives anything. 5° Thus, all of the cash
will be paid to class A, but the remaining 49 RC units must now be
divided between Class A and B. This division can only take place,
however, if some value is placed on the RC units.
It could be argued that, by failing to bid in the initial auction,
the Class B bidders have tacitly acknowledged that the RC units are
worth less than $2 per share, and thus the Class B bidders have
forfeited their right to participate in the reorganized firm. Class A,
however, will be receiving the cash, and is thus entitled to recover
only an additional $47 from the debtor. The absolute priority rule
-or, in Chapter 11 parlance, the "fair and equitable" rule" t-works
both ways: no lower priority claimant is entitled to any recovery
until all senior claimants have been paid in full, but the senior
claimants are not entitled to recover any more than 100 cents on the
dollar. 2 Thus, if the Class B claimants value the RC units at x,

49. See infra pp. 105-06.
50. See Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 788.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994).
52. See In re MCorp Fin., Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 235 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992)
("[Flor a plan to be confirmed when stockholders are eliminated, creditors must
not be provided for more than in full."); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1994)
(plan must be "fair and equitable" to be approved over the vote of a dissenting
class); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988) ("fair and
equitable" means that a plan must "comply with the absolute priority rule").
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where $0.47 < x < $2, the Class B claimants can legitimately claim
that the forfeiture approach violates the absolute priority rule. 3
Indeed, any attempt under the Bebchuk system simply to
award the RC units to the most senior unpaid class would likely
result in vehement protests from any unpaid lower priority classes,
and the system would eventually dissolve in a morass of litigation.
In short, absent either full redemption of a class of options, which
may not occur if a party has secured a majority position in a class,
or a remarkable inter-creditor rapport, valuation of the RC units
(and thus the debtor) will be inevitable, and thus the very problem
Bebchuk identifies as the key failing of Chapter 11 remains at issue.
Moreover, the system is based upon the assumption that the
debtor's total liability is easily ascertainable. Bebchuk touts the
benefits of his approach by blithely proclaiming that "[o]nce a
company enters reorganization, it will be only necessary to
determine all the claims outstanding against the company and to fix
the capital structure that the reorganized company will have. 5 4 Of
course, as any bankruptcy practitioner realizes, determining the full
extent of a debtor's liabilities can consume a substantial portion of
the time spent working on a case.
The time spent preparing the debtor's schedules of assets and
liabilities, setting a bar date, reviewing filed proofs of claim,
litigating claims objections, and generally determining who is owed
what and in what priority can easily represent a large share of the
billable hours in any Chapter 11 case, and could easily take months
to complete.5 Given that Bebchuk's proposal demands awaiting
the outcome of this process, it is an open question whether his
system of options will resolve cases with any greater speed than
presently seen in Chapter 11.
Finally, this system suffers from the flaw, habitual among
academic conceptions of corporate bankruptcy, of assuming that
creditors invariably fall neatly into their respective levels of
priority. 6 For example, a debtor may have two tranches of publicly
53. If the Class B claimants know that they are bidding on a minority stake in
the firm, the spread between the Class C bidders' valuation of $3 per RC unit and
the Class B bidders' valuation of x becomes quite understandable.
54. Bebchuk, Chapter11, supra note 24, at 13 (emphasis added).
55. The tendency of Chapter 11 theorists to illustrate their proposals with
debtors whose sole creditors are bondholders might explain the failure to
appreciate the magnitude of this issue. Real debtors are, of course, faced with a
multitude of creditors, comprised of trade creditors, litigation claimants, current
and former employees, and governmental units, to name but a few.
56. Accord Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights,
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held unsecured debt, the second subordinated to the first.
Typically, however, the subordination clause in the junior indenture
will only apply with respect to the senior bondholders. With
respect to trade creditors, the junior bondholders are pari passu.
The trade creditors, however, are not bound by the subordination
clause, and are thus paripassu with the senior bondholders.
Bebchuk's proclamation that "the division of the reorganized
company's securities will follow automatically and swiftly from the
option scheme's principles"57 would likely ring hollow to the
clearing agent assigned to decide in the first instance whether the
trade creditors should get type-A or type-B option rights in the
debtor. Even if the trade creditors were placed in a distinct class,
the disbursing agent would have to determine the order in which
the various options could be exercised, which is no easy task given
the relative nature of the priorities at issue.
In short, the capital structure hypothesized by Bebchuk's
theory does not reflect a real life capital structure. This system is
unable to handle conflicting creditor priorities or disputed debtor
liabilities and may even run afoul of the absolute priority rule in
certain circumstances. While his program presents an interesting
intellectual game, the failure to connect the theory to practical
corporate finance renders any benefits illusory.
B. Alan Schwartz, "A Contract Theory Approach to Business
Bankruptcy" 8
Professor Schwartz has proposed a system of ex ante
bankruptcy contracting in place of the current largely mandatory
bankruptcy scheme. Schwartz argues that bankruptcy contracts
would be more efficient than Chapter 11, even though "[a] firm
may have numerous creditors; these creditors may lend at different
Priority Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations,87
VA. L. REv. 921, 939 (2001) ("The case for absolute priority is strongest with
respect to modern, large, publicly traded firms with their neatly hierarchical capital
structures.").
57. Bebchuk, Chapter11, supra note 24, at 13.
58. 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998). For a detailed critique of this article, see Lynn
M. LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE L.J. 317
(1999). Professor Schwartz replied to LoPucki's critique in Alan Schwartz,
Bankruptcy ContractingReviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz,
Bankruptcy Contracting]. Professor LoPucki's general theme is that, even if
Schwartz's assumptions are taken at face value, the article itself is internally
inconsistent. I concur with a great deal of Professor LoPucki's analysis and will
not repeat his points here, except to the extent that they overlap with my own.
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times; and they may have different preferences about bankruptcy
systems. '9
To support this bold claim, Schwartz first examines a case in
which all creditors contract with the debtor at the same point in6
time. Two bankruptcy options are assumed to exist at this point.
One, denoted R, is much like Chapter 11. The second system,
denoted L, provides for the sale of insolvent firms, or the assets of
these firms, at auction. Under some circumstances, it will be
optimal for the firm to use system R, but under other
circumstances, system L will be better.61 Both systems rigorously
follow the absolute priority rule, and the parties are free to contract
for either system.62
Parties must choose from among three contract types. The
first type, which Schwartz refers to as a "renegotiation contract,"
resembles current debt agreements in that the bankruptcy system is
not specified, and the debtor is free to choose the bankruptcy
system it favors ex post.63 In the second type of contract, termed
"renegotiation-proof," the creditors authorize the firm to keep a
portion of the monetary return that would be generated by
whatever bankruptcy system it chooses.6' The aim of this contract is
to align the firm's interests with those of the creditors, meaning the
bribe paid to the debtor must outweigh the benefits to the firm of
making an inefficient choice.65 The third type of contract that
Schwartz proposes is the "partially renegotiation-proof contract,"
where the preferred bankruptcy system is determined on the basis
of an outside signal.'
Schwartz then demonstrates that, in a world where all creditors
contract with the debtor simultaneously, a renegotiation-proof
contract, assuming an appropriately set bribe, would induce the
firm to make the optimal choice of bankruptcy systems, because the
sum of the private benefits and cash payments the firm would

59. Schwartz, supra note 58, at 1822.
60. See id. at 1823.
61. Professor Schwartz assumes that all parties can determine, ex post, which
system would be more efficient. As discussed, infra, the basis for this assumption
is, at best, confusing.
62. Schwartz, supra note 58, at 1823.
63. Id. at 1830.
64. Id. at 1827.
65. As I note, infra, Professor Schwartz assumes a unity of interest between
management and shareholders.
66. Schwartz, supra note 58, at 1831. This contract will be renegotiated when
the signal fails to predict an appropriate system. Id.
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obtain would always overcome the benefits to the firm of making
the non-optimal bankruptcy choice.67 Since firms rarely lend at only
one moment, Professor Schwartz then moves to consider a
diachronic model.
At this second stage, the model contemplates two creditors
who contract with the firm sequentially and assumes that the
optimal bribe may vary. 6' To extend the model in this manner,
Schwartz must overcome two key problems: the need to account
for later changes in the degree of the optimal bribe, and variations
with regard to which contract type is most desirable. Moreover, for
the model to have any semblance of practical relevance, Schwartz
must also address the potential for conflicting preferences among
creditors with regard to the choice between bankruptcy systems.69
To solve these problems, Schwartz first incorporates an
uncomplicated two-part conversion device. The conversion term
first provides that "the bribe in the first contract will convert to the
bribe in the second contract."7 Then, the conversion term provides
that all contracts will automatically "convert (only as regards
bankruptcy) to the contract type that is currently optimal for the
firm."7 ' Taken together, the conversion term provides that the last
contract a debtor signs before bankruptcy will govern the level of
optimal bribe and the choice of bankruptcy contracts. Thus, if the
last creditor to negotiate with the debtor bargains for a
renegotiation-proof contract, with a bribe of 10% of the creditor's
recovery, all creditors will automatically be parties to similar
agreements with the debtor.
To overcome the problem of conflicting creditor preferences
between liquidation and reorganization, and the potential that
certain creditors (e.g., trade creditors) will always favor
reorganization and demand "reorganization contracts," Schwartz
offers a two-part solution. First, he argues that the rigorous
enforcement of the absolute priority rule that his system assumes
will dispatch most creditors' conflicts, because, recognizing that
senior creditors must be paid in full before they will recover
67. Id. at 1832.
68. Id. at 1834.
69. Note that, because Professor Schwartz assumes all parties comprehend
which system is efficient, he does not consider the case of a party that erroneously
favors one system over another.
70. Schwartz, supra note 58, at 1834.
71. Id. This apparently means that in certain instances the second part of the
conversion term will negate the first part of the conversion term, as the optimal
contract might be a "renegotiation contract," which entails no bribe.
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anything, junior creditors will prefer the system that maximizes
overall returns. 2 Second, he argues that in the case of trade
creditors and others who may prefer to keep the debtor in business
in hopes of engaging in future transactions with the debtor, the
choice of bankruptcy contract types (and hence bankruptcy
systems) should be governed by majority rule.73 Although not clear
in his original article, Professor Schwartz has since clarified that he
intends for the majority to be determined on the basis of the face
amount of the debt.74 He further assumes that trade creditors will
typically be in the minority under such a voting scheme. Having
thus illustrated that it would be possible for a complex firm to
contract with its creditors for a bankruptcy scheme, Professor
Schwartz bemoans the inability to enter into these contracts under
present law."
Professor LoPucki has previously noted several contradictions
between the "last contract" rule in this system, and the majority
vote provision. Professor Schwartz has addressed some of these
points in a later article, but several issues remain unresolved. For
example, it is not clear if the "last contract" rule is subject to any
limitations. If not, the smallest of contracts (e.g., an agreement to
lease a copy machine) could determine the optimal bribe and
contract type for all of the firm's creditors.76 The debtor, and its
management, would have a strong incentive to time the bankruptcy
filing in relation to a favorable agreement. Indeed, the debtor
would have an incentive to enter into unneeded agreements simply
to rework its fate in bankruptcy.
More generally, it is not clear how the majority of creditors will
be determined temporally. Schwartz proclaims that "a trade
creditor who prefers an inefficient bankruptcy contract should also
be bound to the bankruptcy bargain that the ex ante majority
prefer."7 But when is this ex ante majority to be determined?
Because the composition of an ex ante majority could fluctuate over
time-as creditors are paid and new creditors join the pool-this
aspect of Schwartz's model could again lead the debtor to
manipulate the timing of a bankruptcy filing. In his reply to
Professor LoPucki, Schwartz makes clear that he assumes that trade
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 1837-38.
Id. at 1838.
Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting,supra note 58, at 360 & n.28.
Schwartz, supra note 58, at 1838-39.
Cf.Lynn M. LoPucki, supra note 58, at 326.
Schwartz, supra note 58, at 1838.
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creditors will always be in the minority, and thus the "majority
rule" approach may be nothing more than a "bondholders rule"
approach.78 In a firm where small unsecured creditors were closely
matched with other, larger creditors-consider a firm that was
financed with a large amount of equity- Schwartz's approach
would seem to require constant polling of the creditors as the firm
encounters financial distress, the very time when the firm is unlikely
to be able to afford this undertaking.
The assumption that rigorous enforcement of the absolute
priority rule will negate conflicts among senior and junior
bondholders is also doubtful. If a class of junior bondholders is
entirely "underwater," it will matter little to the class that
liquidation might be more efficient. 9 Reorganization offers the
prospect, however slight, of obtaining some recovery.80 As basic
option theory teaches us, when the junior bondholders are faced
with a certainty that they will recover nothing if the debtor is
liquidated today, Schwartz's faith in the absolute priority rule
quickly fails, because the value of keeping the firm alive with the
hopes of some recovery will always be more valuable to the junior
creditors.81 Moreover, taken together the junior bondholders and
the trade creditors could constitute the majority in a firm. The
heart of Schwartz's model-the belief that the majority will always
make an efficient choice of bankruptcy systems-would therefore
fail.
For example, consider a firm with $100 in senior debt, $100 in
junior debt, $100 in trade debt, and equity holders. If the firm has a
liquidation value of $90, the junior creditors and the trade creditors
would unite to support reorganization under Schwartz's system, as
it offers the only chance for these creditors to recover anything. In
other words, reorganization offers these junior creditors some
"option value," in that these creditors have at least some chance,
however remote, of recovering on their claims in a reorganization.
Because these creditors hold the majority of the firm's debt, an
inefficient choice to reorganize would be made under Schwartz's

78. Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting,supra note 58, at 360.
79. As discussed in section B, infra, intra-class creditor conflicts may also
undermine Schwartz's faith that the absolute priority rule, in and of itself, will be
sufficient to overcome the problem of opposing preferences with regard to
liquidation or reorganization.
80. See LoPucki, supra note 58, at 328-29.
81. See, e.g., R. BREALEY & S. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE

ch. 20 (6th ed. 2000).
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system whenever the junior claimants expected that the proceeds of
a liquidation would be insufficient to discharge the senior debt.
Professor Schwartz has also failed to account for contingent
creditors in his system. While Schwartz seems to assume that, save
for involuntary creditors, all creditors of a firm have current claims
against the debtor, Chapter 11 debtors typically schedule a host of
contingent claimants.82 Many of these contingent creditors assert
contractual claims, and cannot be dismissed as "non-parties" as
Schwartz suggests. While it certainly facilitates the analysis, the
division of the world between parties with currently due and owing
contractual claims on the one hand, and "non-parties" on the other,
incorrectly suggests that bankruptcy policy turns on a crisp choice
between the steadfast protection of contractual rights and the
To the
protection of ever-so-mushy "community interests."
contrary, executives with indemnification agreements, employees
with severance agreements, parties to "requirements" contracts,
parties that have signed guarantees of the debtor's obligations,
employees with collective bargaining agreements, and landlords
with claims for reimbursement of taxes, utilities, and the like under
"triple net" leases are among the many creditors that assert
contractually based contingent claims against a debtor. 3
It is not clear what role, if any, these contingent creditors
would have in a bankruptcy under this system, as Schwartz
apparently assumes that non-contractual claimants are either
involuntary creditors or "non-parties" asserting vague "stakeholder" interests. Contingent contractual creditors are apparently
disenfranchised with respect to the choice of reorganization or
liquidation under Schwartz's "majority rule" approach. The failure
to address these contingent creditors also leaves serious issues
unresolved with regard to the "last contract" rule for setting the
optimal bribe or altering the optimal bankruptcy contract, e.g.,
82. Schwartz notes that "[t]ort and environmental victims of the firm's
activities do not bargain with the firm ex ante, but do have current bankruptcy
claims against it. These claims should be protected in bankruptcy, but just how is
beyond this Essay's scope." Schwartz, supra note 58, at 1810 n.15. These claims
have been at the root of a host of the largest Chapter 11 cases (e.g., Dow Corning,
Johns-Manville, Owens Corning, A.H. Robins), and any system that fails to
address litigation claims is plainly of limited utility. Until these claims are
addressed, Schwartz's system, like many theoretical accounts of corporate
reorganization, remains woefully inadequate.
83. Under the Bankruptcy Code these claims are subject to discharge, see 11
U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994), which avoids the strategic behavior that would occur if
parties could convert their claim into a post-petition claim by simply fixing the
debtor's liability after the filing date.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:2

would Schwartz allow a contingent agreement to function as the

"last contract" under the system?
Schwartz's scheme would also require substantial monitoring
and administrative expense. For example, parties to previously
drafted contracts would demand some form of notice when their

agreement was "updated" to reflect the current vogue in bankruptcy terms. And, as noted earlier, a firm may need to monitor the

body of contracts to determine the composition of the present
majority of creditors in order to determine the firm's choice of
bankruptcy systems. In short, this system requires a firm to develop
a sizeable infrastructure to catalog and monitor all of the firm's

contracts, from the agreements with the landscape company and the
water-cooler service to the firm's indentures and revolving credit
agreements. Plainly, the costs associated with such an undertaking

could outstrip any inefficiencies in the current Chapter 11 system.
Moreover, Schwartz's system may result in excessive vertical
integration as firms attempt to "internalize" the costs associated
with the contractual approach to bankruptcy.
Finally, while it is an old saw that efficiency-oriented theory

assumes away its problems, it .bears noting that Professor
Schwartz's approach rests upon a host of simplifying assumptions
that call into question the plausibility of his proposal.

First,

Schwartz assumes for purposes of his article that "the firm's
managers represent the shareholders' interests perfectly."84 Given
that managers are vested with the power to adopt a reorganization

plan that extinguishes the firm's existing equity, and managers can
avoid or at least delay shareholder censure by failing to call the
annual shareholders meeting,85 this assumption seems unjustifiable.86 It has long been assumed that managerial loyalty to
84. Schwartz, supra note 58, at 1825-26.
85. The failure to hold an annual shareholders meeting generally does not
affect otherwise valid corporate acts. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c)
(2001); N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 602(b) (2001). But cf CAL. CORP. § 600(c) (2001)
(omitting relevant language). Given that shareholders meetings provide a public
forum for angry shareholders to lash out at management-and that the shareholders
may already be suing the management-many large corporate debtors simply
ignore the requirement of holding an annual meeting. While shareholders
nominally have a right to force a shareholders meeting, this right is only partially
realized in reality. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 66 B.R. 517, 541-42 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986).
86. Nonetheless, some version of this assumption undergirds most of the
financial literature on bankruptcy. See, e.g., Thomas H. Noe & Jun Wang,
Strategic Debt Restructuring, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 985, 988 (2000); Per Str6mberg,
Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and
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shareholders cannot be taken for granted, 7 and it would seem
especially odd to assume that it would flourish in Chapter 11, where
officers and directors are accountable to myriad constituencies.'
Moreover, the casual assumption of shareholder-management unity
has significant consequences for Schwartz's analysis. For example,
managers and shareholders may hold quite different conceptions of
the optimal bribe under a renegotiation proof contract.8 9
Schwartz also assumes that the parties know, or will know after
the debtor becomes insolvent, whether liquidation or reorganization is the most efficient route for a firm. This assumption is key
to Schwartz's argument that the parties can contract to induce an
efficient choice between liquidation or reorganization. In a fairly
confusing portion of the article, Schwartz writes that
Creditors can prove in court how much money the firm earned
while in the bankruptcy system it chose (bankruptcy returns are
"verifiable"), and the parties can observe the circumstances that
exist ex post. Thus parties know after insolvency which of the
two bankruptcy systems would maximize monetary returns.9
Schwartz's conclusion does not follow from his premise: once the
firm has earned any amount under a particular bankruptcy system,
it is too late to make a choice among bankruptcy systems.9 ' The
choice then must be made at the point of default (or insolvency in
Schwartz's parlance). Before the start of any particular procedure,
however, there is no reason to believe that even the most
sophisticated of creditors, or debtor's management, can make an

Tests, 55 J. FIN. 2641, 2643 (2000).
87. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
88. See William C. Whitford, What's Right About Chapter 11, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1379, 1384 (1994).
89. Moreover, the failure to distinguish between management and the firm
leads to illogical results and confusion in Schwartz's theory. For example,
Schwartz repeatedly states that "the firm also wants to consume private benefits,"
Schwartz, supra note 58, at 1827, surely a bizarre concept if taken literally, and an
impossibility with respect to the shareholders of most publicly held corporations.
90. Id. at 1823.
91. Schwartz's attempt to deflect Professor LoPucki's criticism of his handling
of the problem of conflicting creditor interests suffers from a similar temporal
problem. See Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting, supra note 58, at 353. In his
model, Schwartz seems to assume that the choice between liquidation and
reorganization takes place simultaneously with a firm's liquidation or
reorganization. Of course, the choice among systems generally must be made, and
a process engaged, before the creditor has an opportunity to compare recoveries
under reorganization or liquidation.
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unbiased and accurate prediction of the variables that can influence
92
the course of a bankruptcy case.
Of course, once a firm has chosen a path, it is easy to engage in
counterfactual theorizing about what might have been, but such an
exercise is of little value once a choice to either reorganize or
liquidate has been made. The majority of creditors are likely to
simply vote their parochial interests when it comes time to
implement Schwartz's "majority rule" approach. It can be expected
that senior creditors will favor liquidation regardless of larger
questions of efficiency. Management may be unable to make an
efficient choice under a renegotiation-proof agreement, despite its
best efforts, and ingrained managerial optimism may take hold and
result in the inevitable choice to reorganize.
Finally, the most obvious, yet critical assumption undergirding
this theory is Schwartz's belief that a system producing more
liquidations would be inherently more efficient. Over twenty years
after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, however, the relative
efficiency of liquidation versus reorganization remains a mystery.
While Schwartz can point to several potential inefficiencies of
reorganization, absent empirical data, and a grounding in the
realities of Chapter 11 as practiced, it is impossible to know if these
are true problems, and how the inefficiencies Schwartz identifies
compare to the costs of a comparable liquidation.93 Since the
formal liquidation of large publicly held companies under Chapter
7 remains a rarity, it is impossible to know if this reality reflects
managerial abuse of Chapter 11, as Schwartz suggests, or a belief
among market participants that Chapter 11 is an optimal system,
even for liquidation." Since anecdotal evidence about any serious
attempts to convert large cases to Chapter 7 is lacking, Professor
Schwartz and. other proponents of more frequent liquidation bear
at least some obligation to demonstrate why it should not be

92. The problem is compounded in Schwartz's system, as the parties must
contract for their desired system at a point in time before the firm even faces a
choice among bankruptcy systems. See LoPucki, supra note 58, at 373.
93. These liquidation costs include not only the loss in going concern value,
but also the costs associated with individualized collection efforts, if the liquidation
is accomplished under state law. See Elizabeth Warren, Untenable Case, supra
note 6, at 468 n.136.
94. Liquidations of large corporations are typically accomplished by way of a
Chapter 11 liquidating plan, which may follow the sale of a company's assets under
11 U.S.C. § 363(b). Recent examples include the liquidations of Vlasic Foods
International, Inc., Brazos Sportswear, Inc., and Mid-American Waste Systems,
Inc. following the sale of most the debtors' operating assets.
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assumed that the market has already decided in favor of
reorganization.
. Professor Schwartz's system leaves us with the impression that
it is more than a few steps removed from practical application.
While the overall intellectual structure of the theory is intriguing,
broad swaths of practical detail remain unaddressed. What is more,
the reliance on the unproven belief that "liquidations are better"
suggests that the theory remains tethered to the unanswered, and
perhaps unanswerable questions that have plagued Chapter 11
theory since its early days.
C. Barry E. Adler, "A Theory of CorporateInsolvency" 95
Professor Adler's approach to bankruptcy reform envisions an
entirely new way of financing corporations. Under the Chameleon
Equity approach, he proposes that firms would replace their current
debt and equity financing with a series of levels of preferred stock.
Upon a default, the lowest level of stock would be automatically
canceled, and the next lowest level of stock would effectively
become the existing common shareholders of the firm. Parties
could structure this system in a way that would only allow firms
with little or no "going concern" value to enter bankruptcy,
indicating that a firm that actually enters bankruptcy under his
system should be liquidated.96 According to Professor Adler,
"automatic conversion of the lowest-priority fixed-obligation class
to common equity, and the survival of higher-priority classes, would
accomplish a reorganization of an insolvent firm without the
expensive imbroglio that is often a consequence of the current
Adler concedes that
bankruptcy reorganization process." 97
corporations have failed to adopt anything resembling his
Chameleon Equity structure "in part because tax, tort, commercial,
and corporate laws create legal impediments to such adoption."9 8
As Warren and Westbrook have noted, these practical impediments
are themselves indications of the theory's viability. 9
95. Adler, supra note 2. This article builds on the system first proposed in
Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993).
96. Adler, supra note 2, at 367.
97. Id. at 353.
98. Id. at 377.
99. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 11, at 1287. The Tax Code modifications
that Professor Adler's approach would require have been the subject of much
debate and little actual legislative action for decades. See generally Katherine
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More importantly, even absent appreciable legal hurdles, it
remains doubtful that any firm would actually finance its operations
through the Chameleon Equity structure. In the first instance,
Adler's approach will only work if firms implement a "cash and
carry" approach to their dealings with trade creditors, as the system
makes no room for a fluid mass of trade debt.' ° Additionally, a
firm would have to accurately predict all of its future liquidity needs
at the time of a preferred stock offering. Indeed, to the extent
there are significant economies of scale with respect to securities
offerings, a firm would be well advised to aggregate its trips to the
financing market, and would have to anticipate liquidity needs very
far in advance.' °'
Failing such foresight, short-term liquidity problems would
either compel the draconian solution of canceling equity or the cost
of a new offering. There is no room for a revolving credit line in
this system. Moreover, the need to accumulate cash may itself have
governance
consequences, from a corporate
destructive
perspective, that outweighs any benefits obtained in reducing the
costs of financial distress. "° The liquidity problems associated with
the Chameleon Equity system may also induce a return to
conglomerate structures, surely a retrograde development in this
day and age.
Professor Adler's system also involves substantial monitoring
expense. Absent a comprehensive, and presumably legislatively
enacted, ban on corporate debt, preferred shareholders would have
to maintain a constant vigil against the creation of debt, which
Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055
(2000). Presumably comparable modifications to the relevant tort, commercial,
and corporate laws would be no easier to achieve.
100. The firm would literally have to pay its trade creditors and employees in
cash, as every unpaid check makes the holder a creditor of the firm.
101. It is conventional wisdom that there are economies of scale in underwriting
fees, see, e.g., Inmoo Lee, et al., The Costs of Raising Capital, 19 J. FIN. RES. 59
(1996), but a recent article argues that underwriting spreads may actually move in
relation to issuer quality without regard to the size of the offering. Oya Altmkihq
& Robert S. Hansen, Are There Economies of Scale in Underwriting Fees?
Evidence of Rising External FinancingCosts, 13 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 191 (2000).
102. See Tom Nohel & Vefa Tarhan, Share Repurchases and Firm Performance:
New Evidence on the Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1998)
(concluding that the positive investor reaction to repurchases represents the
perceived value of eliminating management control over liquid assets); see also
James F. Cotter & Sarah W. Peck, The Structure of Debt and Active Equity
Investors: The Case of the Buyout Specialist 59 J. FIN ECON. 101 (2001) (finding
that using more senior debt significantly increases the performance of post-LBO
firms).
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would obtain a senior priority in the debtor's capital structure.
Given the multitude of ways a claim against a firm can come into
existence, this monitoring would be problematic.
Covenants
between the preferred shareholders and the debtor-firm would
provide some protection, but a breach of contract claim against an
insolvent firm is of little value at the end of the day.
In sum, the Chameleon Equity structure sacrifices a good deal
of financing adaptability for the sake of an event that most firms
will never know. The respective benefits offered by capital leases,
secured debt, straight debt, subordinated debt, convertible debt,
preferred stock, and common stock simply cannot be replicated by
an array of preferred stock, no matter what the bankruptcy gains.
III. A General Critique of Current Chapter 11 Theory
The Bebchuk, Schwartz, and Adler articles represent the core
of a larger body of Chapter 11 theory, the majority of which is
hostile to Chapter 11 as currently constituted. Four general
problems underlie this body of work and explain the failure of
reorganization theory. First, the authors of these theories rarely
acknowledge the complex ownership and capital structures at issue
in large Chapter 11 cases, or the reasons for these structures.
Second, these theorists have no more than a superficial
understanding of Chapter 11. Closely related to this second point,
the authors of these theories also fail to demonstrate, other than by
mere declaration, that their favored system would result in any
significant efficiency gains. Finally, the authors of these theories
never explain how theories developed within abstract models can
be connected to a practical model that even resembles the proffered
theory.
A. CorporateComplexity and Simple Models
In the view of the typical academic, the run-of-the-mill
corporate debtor is a large, publicly traded firm, with an
exceedingly simple capital structure. Ideally, the firm will have no
employees, trade creditors, litigation claimants, obligations to
governmental authorities, or contingent claims. The closest real
world equivalent to the academic model would be a simple holding
company-with one or two tranches of bondholder debt and one
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class of publicly held common stock-which continues to be listed
on a national exchange even after the debtor files for bankruptcy. 03
The model firm is at the same time too large, and too simple.
Thirty-eight public firms with assets of more than $500 million filed
for Chapter 11 relief in 2000, only four of which had assets of more
than $5 billion."° In 1999, there were thirty Chapter 11 cases
involving public companies with assets of more than $500 million.
Thus, the firms that are modeled are truly unique, representing the
largest of the cases handled by five or six leading law firms in two or
three major cities in the country.
More importantly, the large firms that do file for Chapter 11
relief rarely have the austere capital structures that most academic
models take for granted. And even firms with simple balance
sheets may have complex capital structures, especially when
existent and expected litigation claims, priority disputes, intercompany claims, and collateral valuation issues are thrown into the
mix.
The reasons for the complexity found in large corporate
debtors is in part a result of the "tax, tort, commercial, and
corporate laws" that Professor Adler seeks to repeal.'0 6 But
financial structures in troubled companies also echo past corporate
acquisitions that resulted in the assumption of the financial
structures of several smaller companies. They also reflect certain
legacy effects, in as much as certain transactions-e.g., equipment
purchases-have almost always been financed in particular ways,
and companies find cost saving in following previously established
forms.
Financial structures also reflect the partitioning of a firm's
assets among creditors. Just as the creation of the firm itself
reflects, among other things, an attempt to define a set of assets

103. Many companies that file for relief under Chapter 11 have, in fact, been
delisted by an exchange. One author found that only 20% of the public firms that
filed for Chapter 11 between 1986 and 1993 were listed on an exchange. Brian L.
Betker, The Administrative Costs of Debt Restructurings: Some Recent Evidence,
FIN. MGMT. 26, 58 (1997). The author did not report what portions of the 80% of
unlisted firms were delisted, and what portion had never been listed.
104. Owens Corning was the largest, with assets of almost $6.5 billion. All
figures are taken from data complied by New Generation Research, Inc., available
at http:\\www.bankruptcydata.com.
105. ARM Financial Group, Inc., with assets of more than $9 billion, was the
largest public company to file in 1999. No other company had assets of more than
$5 billion.
106. Adler, supra note 2, at 377.
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associated with an enterprise,"7 a firm partitions itself throughout
its life in an attempt to meet liquidity and capital needs. Thus, the
firm's equipment may be pledged to equipment vendors, inventory
and receivables to banks, and fixed assets to bondholders. The
liquidity problems that often precede a bankruptcy filing may
induce management to seek new sources of funding through this
partitioning process, thus rendering the firm's capital structure even
more complex. The result is a firm that has been partitioned among
creditors, and yet also remains liable as a whole to a larger group of
completely unsecured creditors.
Accordingly, a more realistic model would start with a secured
bank line, issued to the parent company and guaranteed by the
subsidiaries, often secured by the operating assets of the
subsidiaries and the parent company's stock in the subsidiaries,
which would likely be further subdivided between term loans,
revolving credit facilities, and a line for writing letters of credit.
The loan would either be held by a group of banks, or, as is
becoming more common, the loan would be a leverage loan
facility." In either case, the loan can be divided into various
tranches, each of which may have a differing priority against the
debtor.l°9
The parent company will also have issued at least one layer of
publicly held debt, which again may be guaranteed by the
subsidiaries. The operating companies will have a variety of trade
creditors, who are typically pari passu with the public debt, and the
guarantees of that debt. The trade debt will itself be variegated,
based upon the size and sophistication of the trade creditor in
question. General Electric or Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing can wait for payment of a one million dollar pre-petition
debt, but a more modestly sized trade creditor may face financial

107. See generally, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role
of OrganizationalLaw, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
108. Cf. Edward I. Altman & Heather J. Suggit, Default Rates in the Syndicated
Bank Loan Market: A Mortality Analysis, 24 J. Bank. & Fin. 229, 236 (2000).
109. For example, during the relatively brief period between its first and second
Chapter 11 case, Bradlees Stores, Inc. entered into a working capital facility that
consisted of three tranches. Tranche A consisted of a $250 million senior-secured
revolving line of credit, of which $90 million was available for letters of credit.
Like Tranche A, Tranche B was secured by the debtor's non-real estate assets, and
consisted of a $20 million junior secured credit facility. Tranche C consisted of a
$20 million credit facility, secured by second liens on the debtor's non-real estate
assets and a first lien on certain leasehold assets.
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problems themselves if an anticipated receivable is suddenly
withheld.
Landlords are also of equal priority with the trade creditors,
but are subject to the Bankruptcy Code's system that allows debtors
to assume or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases. If a
lease is assumed, the landlord must be paid in full. If the lease is
rejected, the landlord becomes a pre-petition creditor, even though
the landlord's claim for breach of the lease may arise years after the
debtor first entered bankruptcy court. In a very large case, or in a
retail bankruptcy, a debtor may have hundreds of real property
leases. While the unique nature of leases may be a consequence of
the Bankruptcy Code as currently drafted, distinguishing landlords
from the mass of creditors also acknowledges the fact that many
landlords, save for large REITs, are relatively unsophisticated,
especially in comparison to other creditors with similar size claims.
The other major constituencies to be considered include utility
companies, employees, equipment lessors, and shareholders.
Unless the model takes into account these major parties to any
reorganization, at least in the later variants of the model, the true
complexity of the conflicts in bankruptcy will never be captured.
While it is possible to model a bankruptcy system that assumes that
firms will make any needed change to its capital structure to
conform to the bankruptcy scheme, this assumption is hardly
plausible. Like building a bomb shelter in your backyard, radically
changing a firm's capital structure to accommodate a future
Chapter 11 filing is an expensive undertaking that guards against a
remote possibility. Few large firms ever experience Chapter 11,
and probably even more firms assume that they will never enter
Chapter 11.
B. MisunderstandingReorganization (Myths About Chapter11)
One can read a good deal of Chapter 11 theory and criticism
without ever stumbling upon a clear explanation of what Chapter
11 entails. Aside from vague utterances about "negotiated bargaining," most authors do not feel the need to define the target of their
attacks." °

110. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, The Emergence of Markets in Chapter 11: A Small
Step on North LaSalle Street, 8 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1 (2000); Bebchuk, Using Options,
supra note 24, at 831; Oliver Hart et al., A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses
Multiple Auctions, 41 Eur. Econ. Rev. 461, 463 (1997).
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When Chapter 11 is defined, it often appears in the most
superficial of ways)" These explanation of Chapter 11 are in
general not patently wrong, but they reflect a hornbook understanding of the process, which often differs from reality.
1. Reorganization According to Theory-One of the most
paradoxical aspects of many efficiency-based theories of reorganization is that these theories rarely offer the debtor any real
opportunity to reorganize.
Efficiency theorists have almost
uniformly authored theories of "reorganization" that depend on
either the quick sale or liquidation of a company. Save for any
reorganization of the debtor under a new owner, these proposals
are not concerned with reorganization, and bankruptcy is merely a
form of debt collection. "2 Given that these authors typically have
no basis for assuming that it will be practical to sell a Chapter 11
debtor as a going concern, many of these theories ultimately boil
down to proposals to liquidate the debtor.'
If a firm is in a
declining industry with excess capacity, the gains from quickly
redeploying assets through a sale-if a sale is even realistic-will be
relatively small, or non-existent."' Even if a firm is in a healthy
market segment, steadfast requirements that any sale occur within
an expedited and bounded time frame will likely result in "lowball" offers for the debtor."' Similarly, blindly exchanging debt for
equity, or otherwise "automating" the process, does not represent a
sincere reorganization of a troubled company, and likely amounts
to nothing more than a postponement of the firm's problems.
The view of reorganization and liquidation that informs these
theories also assumes a clean divide between the two bankruptcy
functions."'6 In point of fact, Chapter 11 is often used to "partially

111. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion et al., Interdisciplinary Conference on
Bankruptcy & Insolvency Theory: Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 849, 857 (1994).
112. Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution,Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A
Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 n.3 (1987) (viewing bankruptcy as an
alternative method of debt collection that should adhere to non-bankruptcy
substantive rights).
113. In these cases, the appropriate frame of reference may not be Chapter 11
but Chapter 7.
114. See Vojislav Maksimovic & Gordon Phillips, Asset Efficiency and
Reallocation Decisions of Bankruptcy Firms, 53 J. FIN. 1495 (1998).
115. See Todd C. Pulvino, Effects of Bankruptcy Court Protection on Asset
Sales, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 151, 154 (1999) (arguing that the bankruptcy status, even
under the current system, encourages "low ball" offers by opportunistic bidders).
116. Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate
Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 68-69 (1992).
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liquidate" a business that has over-extended itself."1 7 Be it through
the rejection of unprofitable operating leases, or the sale of illadvised acquisitions, Chapter 11 works as a vehicle for unwinding,
and often liquidating, the unprofitable portion of a business.
Although in theory the new owner of a firm could accomplish this
same sort of restructuring post-auction, Chapter 11 provides a
convenient way to partition a firm's operations in a single,
comprehensive transaction. In the process, however, Chapter 11

serves a function that transcends the simple "hypothetical sale"
approach to reorganization that appears in many academic papers.
On the other hand, the curious view of "reorganization" that
permeates many theoretical discussions of Chapter 11 works well
with the highly atypical companies that populate these models.
2. The Myth of ShareholderActivism -As touched on in the

discussion of Professor Schwartz's approach to reorganization, it is
a common theoretical move to conflate management and equity,
thereby avoiding the complications of the tripartite debtor-creditorshareholder conflict that pervades corporate reorganization." 8 It is
also often stated in theoretical conceptions of Chapter 11 that,
because firms tend to prefer to confirm a consensual plan,

shareholders are in a position to extract rents from more senior
creditors."9

Given the relative ease with which a plan can be

117. Examples of this can be seen in any of the recent retail Chapter 11 cases in
which the debtor has often closed multiple unprofitable locations. The cap on
lease rejection damages contained in 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (1994) makes Chapter
11 an especially attractive vehicle for shrinking the retail firm that has grown too
fast.
118. For example, Richard Posner explains that under Chapter 11:
[M]anagement is allowed to continue operating the corporation as debtor
in possession; there is no trustee, and no steps are taken to liquidate the
firm. But the corporation must come up with a plan of reorganization
within six months, whereby the firm will continue in operation but with a
different ownership structure. The plan will propose converting the debt
of the corporation into stock and other securities to be assigned to the
creditors in payment of the corporation's debt to them, so that the
creditors will become the corporation's owners (or principal owners,
because often the original shareholders assign themselves some part of
the stock).
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 443-44 (5th ed. 1998). Note
the subtle move from "management" to "the corporation," to "original
shareholders."
See also Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Ex Ante Costs of Violating
Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy, 57 J. FIN. 445 (2002) (forthcoming, draft available
at http://ww.afajoforg/Pdf/feb02/Bebchuk.PDF).
119. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Chapter11, supra note 24.
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"crammed down"
on equity, this proposition seems plainly
20
unsupportable.
For the most part, shareholders play little, if any, role in a
Chapter 11 case. Indeed, the few recently reported cases of
shareholder activism in large Chapter 11 cases concerned either the
relatively exceptional case of firms filing for Chapter 11 relief to
avoid mass tort liability, or instances in which a class of creditors
has obtained a controlling block of equity.' 2' In the first case, the
firm is likely solvent (but for the potential litigation claims) and
shareholders have a strong interest in seeing that management does
not enter into an overly generous settlement agreement with the
litigants. In the second, the "shareholders" are plainly advancing
their interests as creditors.
Equity is commonly canceled in Chapter 11 plans, and new
equity issued to creditors.2
Shareholders therefore have little
incentive to sink further funds, in the form of hiring bankruptcy
counsel to contest the plan, into their already unprofitable
investment as it is quite probable that they will receive nothing
under the plan in any event. Moreover, unless a firm enters
bankruptcy as a result of a sudden financial shock, shareholders
120. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C)(ii) (1994), a plan can be crammed down
over the dissent of a class of interests (i.e., equity) if no junior class will receive any
recovery under the plan. Given that this is almost universally the case with respect
to equity, achieving this form of cram down is quite undemanding. Early studies of
Chapter 11 often found absolute priority violations in favor of equity, but
anecdotal evidence suggests that these studies may no longer reflect current
practice. See infra note 81.
121. See In re Johns-Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm., 801 F.2d 60
(2d Cir. 1986); In re Marvel Entertainment Group. v. Chase Manhattan Bank (In
re Marvel Entertainment Group), 209 B.R. 832 (D. Del. 1997).
122. A search (conducted on December 13, 2001) of the Bankruptcy
DataSource files on LEXIS revealed that in the previous 12 months alone, the
following companies proposed plans which provided for no distribution to equity:
Coram Healthcare Corporation; Hechinger Company; Loewen Group
International, Inc.; Vlasic Foods International, Inc.; American ECO Holding
Corp.; Applied Magnetics Corporation; Bradlees Stores, Inc.; Cambridge
Industries, Inc.; Stellex Technologies, Inc.; Kitty Hawk, Inc.; Oldgen, Inc.; Mediq,
Inc.; MicroAge, Inc.; Stage Stores, Inc.; DeVliegh-Bullard, Inc.; Hedstrom
Holdings, Inc.; LaRoche Industries, Inc.; Vista Eyecare, Inc.; AgriBioTech, Inc.;
Master Graphics, Inc.; Complete Management, Inc.; Fruit of the Loom, Inc.;
Medical Resources, Inc.; Laclede Steel Company; and Prime Succession, Inc.
Several other firms proposed plans that resulted in significant dilutions of equity.
For example, American Banknote Corporation shareholders received 7.7% of the
new equity in the reorganized company. Accord Allan C. Eberhart et al., The
Equity Performance of Firms Emerging from Bankruptcy, 54 J. FIN. 1855, 1855
(1999) ("When firms emerge from bankruptcy, they often cancel the old stock and
distribute an entirely new issue of common stock.").
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likely have witnessed a long-running decline in the firm's share
price, prompting many shareholders to sell out before the
bankruptcy case. The group of shareholders that continue to hold
their shares after the filing is thus likely to be heavily weighted in
favor of inattentive, and inactive
shareholders, combined with a
23
group of disappointed optimists.
Management is therefore likely to shift its attention to
creditors, who may soon become the firm's new shareholders.
Indeed, it is not difficult to find instances where shareholders write
to the bankruptcy court, or bankruptcy counsel, to complain that
they are being ignored by current management. 2 4 In some cases,
where shareholders continue to maintain some interest in the firm,
the United States Trustee will appoint an "equity securities holders
committee," which allows shareholders to present a united front to
management.'
The need for such a committee, however, underscores the dubious nature of the assumption that management can
generally be viewed as subservient to equity in Chapter 11 cases.'26
In addition, when debts become aggregated in a few hands-most
often as the result of claims trading-creditors exercise significant
disciplinary power over management, which assures that management will resist the temptation to favor their former masters. The
contention that shareholders can use Chapter 11 to extract rents
from a distressed corporation is thus unpersuasive.
3.
The Importance of the Trade Creditors-The trade
creditor-be they vendor or customer-is one of the most
neglected and misunderstood parties in Chapter 11 theory. Often
trade creditors are ignored by theorists altogether, or reduced to a
123. A fair amount of small investors apparently make investment decisions
based upon faulty notions of Chapter 11. See Gretchen Morgenson, Market Watch:
Shaky Concerns Are the Talk of Chat Rooms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, § 3, at 1.
124. See, e.g., Letter dated October 24, 1994 from shareholder of Cambridge
Biotech Corporation to bankruptcy court official. In re Cambridge Biotech Corp.,
94-43054 (JFQ) (Bankr. D. Mass. Oct. 24, 1994) (on file with author). In the letter,
the shareholder asks "[d]oesn't Cambridge Biotech, even though it is in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy have a duty to inform common stock shareholders what is going on?"
Id.
125. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1994). Such a committee was eventually appointed
in the Cambridge Biotech Corp. case.
126. Cf United States Trustee v. Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders Crimi
Mae Inc.), 247 B.R. 146, 152 (D. Md. 1999) (noting that bankruptcy court had
"found that a committee of equity security holders would be beneficial to the
reorganization process by ensuring that these investors will have a voice in the plan
formulation and confirmation process.").
127. See Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the
Market for Control of Distressed Firms, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 402-03 (1997).
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faceless class of junior creditors in hypotheticals. When trade
creditors are addressed, they are often seen as co-conspirators in
the perpetuation of broken firms. While Professor Adler calls for
the abolition of trade debt, and Professor Schwartz calls for the
disenfranchisement of these creditors, trade debt actually plays a
vital role both ex ante and ex post in the financing of a firm.
Ex ante, the presence of trade debt signals that unsecured
creditors are willing to deal with the company, and conveys
important information to potential investors, who may have less
insight into the debtor's day-to-day operations. If a trade creditor is
unwilling to extend credit to a firm for thirty or sixty days, an
investor may rightly wonder if it would be prudent to extend credit
to the same firm for ten or more years. A tightening of trade credit
is often the first public signal of a firm's financial trouble. Absent
the information conveyed by the presence of trade debt, investors
might incur additional expenses gathering information about the
firm, expenses which would ultimately raise the costs of debt
financing, in violation of a basic tenet held by most, if not all, of the
efficiency-minded critics of Chapter 11.
Ex post (i.e., following a Chapter 11 filing) trade creditors take
on an import that exceeds the face value of their claims, as many
such creditors have the ability to halt a debtor's operations by
halting deliveries. Contrary to the common belief that trade
creditors are the most junior players in a Chapter 11 case, save for
equity, some trade creditors come to the bankruptcy case with
state-law mechanics and possessory liens in the debtor's goods and
projects. Even those trade creditors that are contractually bound to
continue serving the debtor may have leverage over the debtor if
they provide services beyond what is contractually mandated. For
example, the shipping company that is obligated to provide six
trucks a day to the debtor's plant may discontinue its prior practice
of providing seven trucks when the debtor's output warrants this
additional capacity.
Thus, debtor's will often seek to pay certain trade creditors as
"critical vendors." 2 ' Plainly, these payments violate the absolute
128. Recent examples of this practice can be seen in, In re Trans World
Airlines, Inc., Case No. 01-0056 (SLR) (D. Del. Jan. 27, 2001) (approving
payments of up to $9.8 million in pre-petition trade vendor claims); In re Owens
Coming, Case No. 00-03837 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 6, 2000) (approving
payment of pre-petition "critical" trade vendors claims); In re Philip Servs.
(Delaware), Inc., Case No. 99-02385 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. June 28, 1999)
(authorizing payment of up to $15 million in claims of critical vendors and
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priority rule, to the extent that they allow a select group of
unsecured creditors to recover more than they would recover in a
liquidation, yet it is hard to envision any system of reorganization
functioning without a means to ensure the cooperation of at least a
core group of the debtor's suppliers. Even those systems that call
for auction of the debtor shortly after the bankruptcy filing might
require the payment of "critical vendors" to ensure that the
debtor's going concern value was not destroyed pending the
outcome of the auction.
Accordingly, when it comes time to vote on a plan, the debtor's
trade creditors may not be the docile group of junior creditors that
is often depicted in bankruptcy theory. Indeed, those vendors that
would have been most likely to side with the debtor may have been
removed from the class by way of critical vendor payments. Many
remaining vendors will harbor ill will towards the debtor, having
been told that they are not "critical vendors" entitled to early
payment.
Other vendors will themselves have experienced financial
distress, if not bankruptcy, as a result of the delay in payment of a
claim that may have represented a large portion of the vendor's
income for the year. Some creditors will step to the front of the
line, asserting secured claims as a result of their state law liens,
although many of these creditors will also have been paid during
the course of the case as a consequence of the debtor's need for the
goods that were subject to the lien. 29 Finally, many trade creditors
will have sold their claims to "vulture" investors, who represent
some of the most active participants in a bankruptcy case. Thus the
class of trade creditors often contradicts the picture painted by
Professor Schwartz and others of a group committed to the
preservation of the debtor, regardless of the long-term efficiency
consequences of such a course of action.
As any practitioner can attest, the early days of a large Chapter
11 case involve intense negotiations with vendors and customers
who often react to news of a Chapter 11 filing in ways that seem to
be patently against their long-term interests: railroads halt boxcars,
service firms pull their employees from the debtor's plants,
suppliers call to assert reclamation rights under the U.C.C., all

suppliers with ongoing relationships with the debtors).
129. See, e.g., In re VF Brands, Inc., Case No. 01-00285 (SLR) (D. Del. Jan. 29,
2001); In re Eagle Food Centers, Inc., Case No. 00-01311 (ARM) (D. Del. Mar. 2,
2000).
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despite the prospect that future business with the debtor might be
more valuable than any losses the creditor might suffer on their
pre-petition claim. If the debtor's business is to continue, these
concerns must be addressed.
That existing Chapter 11 theory could neglect trade creditors
in the face of their manifest importance is but the most clear
example of how these theories are disconnected from the financial
and operational realities of the typical Chapter 11 debtor.
Theorists that impair or otherwise undermine the role of trade
creditors have a duty to explain why this move would not result in
significant increases in the ex ante costs of debt financing for all
firms, as a result of the loss of the information conveyed by trade
debt.
4.
The Myth of the Duped Creditor- Current Chapter 11
theory has adopted somewhat conflicting contentions: the costs of
Chapter 11 are said to be born by all borrowers ex ante, and a
debtor's lenders ex post. Thus, critics of Chapter 11 often complain
that Chapter 11 increases the costs of borrowing through increased
interest rates and the like, and imposes significant costs on lenders
through delay and reduced recoveries.
Plainly, however, if the borrowers have already paid for the
expense of Chapter 11, it is not quite accurate to state that creditors
are incurring costs ex post. In Chapter 11, a lender is simply forced
to realize a cost that the borrower paid for long ago. To be sure, if
lenders systematically underestimated the costs of Chapter 11 this
would not hold, but it is hard to believe that lenders would be able
to survive in the market if they were making such errors.
Moreover, since the Bankruptcy Code has now been in operation
for over twenty years, lenders, at least sophisticated lenders, should
be in a position to anticipate and price the costs of Chapter 11,
whatever they may be. After the disastrous Eastern Airlines case,
it would be hard to suggest that lenders are unaware of the
potential "worst case scenarios" that could develop in Chapter 11.13
Even if the issue is phrased as one of "efficiency," it is not at all
clear that the mere presence of costs equates with inefficiency, at
least from the perspective of the firm and its lenders. Indeed, what
may be ex ante efficient for the firm, or its management, might be

130. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also
Lawrence A. Weiss & Karen H. Wruck, Information Problems, Conflicts of
Interest, and Asset Stripping: Chapter11's Failurein the Case of Eastern Airlines, 48
J. FIN. ECON. 55 (1998).
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highly inefficient from a social perspective and visa-versa. For
example, while it is a fundamental tenet of finance theory that, ex
ante, lenders and shareholders will want to limit the firm's ex post
flexibility and thereby reduce ex ante borrowing costs, the
borrower's management is in fact likely to seek as much ex post
flexibility as practicable, passing the cost of this flexibility on to the
shareholders. While it might be more efficient for society as a
whole to discourage lending arrangements of this sort, as all firms
may pay some small amount for a particular firm's investment in
reorganizational flexibility, ultimately the borrower and lender will
have little incentive to take these considerations into account if
their private interests lie elsewhere."'
The point being that costs imposed upon lenders during the
pendency of a Chapter 11 case are largely irrelevant if these costs
have already been recovered from the borrower.
Merely
bemoaning the presences of "costs" is thus unhelpful; at best these
costs are likely nothing more than a familiar deadweight cost of the
separation of ownership and control in a firm. Of course such costs
will be of concern to the borrower ex ante, and may raise concerns
of societal efficiency, but there is no reason to lament the mere
presence of costs ex post unless such costs were entirely
unforeseeable. 32
C. Is Chapter 11 Really Inefficient?
1. The Costs of Chapter 11-Much of the efficiency-based
literature on Chapter 11 finds its foundation in the claim that
Chapter 11 imposes significant ex ante and ex post costs on creditors
and on borrowers in the capital markets.'33 Lenders incur costs
when their contractual rights are not respected under Chapter 11
and when their recoveries are diminished by a long and' costly
Chapter 11 process. Borrowers incur costs when they are forced, ex
ante, to bear the costs of Chapter 11 through higher costs of capital.
The costs of Chapter 11, although widely believed by
academics to be quite substantial, have been difficult to unearth.
131. Cf Steven Shavell, The FundamentalDivergence Between the Private and
the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. L. STUDIES 575 (1997).
132. Such unforeseeable costs are, in point of fact, nothing more than a variant
of the retroactivity problem that has been the obsession of western jurisprudence
for at least the last fifty years. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW
(2d ed. 1969).
133. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic
Analysis of CorporateBankruptcy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 90 (1995).
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Empirical studies have found that the direct costs of Chapter 11chiefly the professional fees incurred-are quite modest, and are
actually lower than those incurred in other significant corporate
transactions.' 3' Another study has found that firms that experience
financial, as opposed to economic, distress incur the bulk of the
costs of such distress in the period before filing for Chapter 11.'5'
While it is easy to point to the myriad troubles experienced by firms
in Chapter 11-increased employee turnover, managerial distraction,
vendor difficulties, loss of business reputation, higher debt costs
and the like-it seems likely that these indirect costs would be
associated with financial or economic distress generally, irrespective
of the nature of Chapter 11.
That the critics of Chapter 11 have not proved that Chapter 11
is excessively expensive is, however, only half of the matter. A
close look at the potential costs of the proposed replacements for
Chapter 11 is also warranted. Plainly, the costs of reorganization
cannot be reduced to zero, and it also does not represent a true
reduction in costs if expenses are simply shifted in time. The spread
between the total costs of Chapter 11, as currently constituted, and
the total costs under a hypothetical reform proposal is the key issue,
but virtually the whole of Chapter 11 theory neglects to even
attempt any such analysis. As noted with regard to the articles
critiqued in section II, however, many current Chapter 11 reform
proposals would appear to entail significant costs, and it is in
question whether these costs might not outstrip the costs of the
current Chapter 11.136 Further, there is at least some possibility that
liquidations or auctions of firms might ultimately result in just as
many absolute priority violations as reorganization, notwithstanding formal compliance with priority rules.'37 At the very least,
the authors that would repeal Chapter 11 in place of some
ostensibly superior system have some obligation to demonstrate

134. Stephen J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An
Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 509 (2000); see also Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution:
Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990).
135. Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not
Economic) Distress? Evidence From Highly Leveraged Transactions That Became
Distressed,53 J. FIN. 1143 (1998).
136. See Lubben, The Direct Costs of CorporateReorganization,supra note 134,
at 548-50.
137. Per Stromberg, supra note 86, at 2645 (arguing that owner/mangers and
senior lenders may conspire to deflate the sale value of auctioned firms, to the
determent of mid-level claimants).
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exactly how their approach would result in any significant efficiency
gains.
2. Is Chapter 11 Really Inefficient?-Chapter 11's stated
inefficiency is, of course, the keystone of much of the literature on
this subject. The common claim is that violations of the absolute
priority rule undermine ex ante contractual expectations, leading to
an eventual increase in the costs of capital, or even reducing the
availability of capital.'38 Given the few large firms that ultimately
file for Chapter 11 relief and the modest nature of the absolute
priority violations that do occur, the expected ex ante costs of
Chapter l1's failure to adhere to a strict absolute priority rule
should be quite modest.3 9 Moreover, some creditors may have the
ability to impose these costs solely on defaulting borrowers,
40 thereby
further reducing the ex ante costs to borrowers in general.'
In short, the ex ante costs that theorists have attacked with
much vigor may be quite small. As with the direct costs of Chapter
11, supra, this raises the question of how the societal inefficiencies
of Chapter 11 fair in comparison to the putative efficiency gains
under the competing, theoretical forms of corporate reorganization.
Even assuming that all asserted efficiency gains are realized, the
potential for offsetting losses-such as would occur if viable firms
were needlessly liquidated-also presents the question of whether
the gains under the reforms are significant. These are, at present,
questions without answers, but they do highlight the failure of many
theorists to even address these issues. The connection between the
theoretical model and the larger world is once again lacking.
3. The Overlooked Facet of Creditor Conflicts-It is widely
recognized that junior and senior claimants have divergent interests
upon the onset of financial distress. A rarely recognized problem is
the frequency of intra-class creditor conflicts, a problem that goes
beyond mere differing risk tolerances or preferences.
138. Philippe Aghion et al., supra note 111, at 853.
139. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share
in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 125, 142 (1990) (finding that these violations rarely exceeded 10% of the
value of the total distribution to unsecured creditors). Note that LoPucki and
Whitford's figures reflect the early years of the new Bankruptcy Code. In more
recent times, anecdotal evidence suggests that existing equity is often canceled as
part of a Chapter 11 plan. See supra,note 122.
140. For example, a recent theoretical article proposes that banks do not price
default in initial lending arrangements, leaving these terms to be negotiated on an
"as needed" basis when the borrower encounters financial difficulties. See Gary
Gorton & James Kahn, The Design of Bank Loan Contracts, 13 REV. OF FIN.
STUD. 331 (2000).
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Consider a firm that issues public debentures. At the time of
the issue, the firm's debt may be classed as investment grade.
Several mutual funds, insurance companies, and other institutions
purchase the issue, but a host of individuals also purchase small
portions of the offering. As the issuing firm's prospects fade, and
the firm becomes a "fallen angel," the original institutional holders
will sell their debentures to the distressed securities arms of major
investment banks, and other "vulture" investors.4 Quite understandably, these secondary purchasers pay much less than par for
the debentures.
When the issuing firm enters Chapter 11, it will have a class of
bondholders that is actually comprised of two types of holders, each
with quite divergent interests. On the one hand, the holders that
bought the debentures at face value will view anything less than
payment of the full face amount of the debentures as a loss. The
secondary purchasers, however, will view any recovery that is
greater than their purchase price, even if less than par, as a gain.
If the secondary investors purchased the debentures for ten
cents on the dollar, a plan that offers a forty percent recovery
represents a tremendous gain to the secondary purchasers, and a
sixty percent loss to the holders who bought in at face value. Thus,
the assumption in many academic articles that creditors of equal
priority stand united against the debtor, and creditors of other
priorities, quickly falls apart under a more realistic conception of
financial distress. This calls into question the likelihood of quick
coordination on an optimal disposition of the debtor. Once intraclass conflict is recognized, the proposition that strict enforcement
of the absolute priority rule will dissipate potential creditor
conflicts, as argued by Professor Schwartz and others, also becomes
suspect.
4. The Ambiguous Nature of Ex Post Adaptability-While it
would be easy to assume that efforts to enhance adaptability in
corporate reorganization invariably increase overall costs-and most
existing critiques of Chapter 11 rest upon just such an assumptionthe true impact these changes is unclear. For example, lenders
value statutory and contractual provisions that allow for a
regularized and comprehensive restructuring process. When the
possibility of default is deemed remote, the lender may feel that

141. Many such institutional holders-such as insurance companies and trust
departments-may face statutory or institutional bars on holding distressed
securities.
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only an exceptional event would lead to a default. Under these
circumstances, the potential need to give an otherwise laudable
borrower a "second chance" may warrant ex post flexibility.
The common assumption that Chapter 11 enhances the overall
costs of borrowing may only hold for less creditworthy borrowers.
Flexibility presents a significant moral hazard problem with respect
to these borrowers. On the other hand, when a loan is made with
an understanding that the chances of default are quite high, the
parties may anticipate the need for restructuring and thus value
flexibility in these instances as well. Consequently, even in the case
of high-risk borrowers, the effect of flexibility on the overall cost of
borrowing is unclear, and the costs and benefits of various rules
may tend to operate in contrary directions. Absent empirical data,
it simply cannot be assumed that provisions that enhance the
debtor's ability to reorganize will invariable lead to any specific
overall result.
IV. Conclusion
In 1916, the poet Siegfried Sassoon-then an experienced
infantry officer serving at the western front-was sent to an officers
training school for a "refresher course." After the war, Sassoon
recalled that
Although I was closely acquainted with the mine-craters in the
Fricourt section, I would have welcomed a few practical hints on
how to patrol those God-forsaken cavities. But the Army
School instructors were all in favor of Open Warfare, which was
sure to come soon, they said. They had learnt all about it in
that we should be taught to "think in
peace time; it was essential
142
terms of mobility.,

The obvious point being that the gulf between theory and practice
is hardly new and not confined to law. But if Chapter 11 theory is
going to be something more than wishful thinking-Open Warfare
lessons for soldiers in trenches-it must have some rooting in the
existing reality of corporate reorganization.
As the prior sections have illustrated, existing Chapter 11
theory has developed to serve a type of firm, and a type of
proceeding, that exists only in academia. Existing models are not
simplified versions of the reality of corporate reorganization, but
142. SIEGFRIED SASSOON, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, in THE MEMOIRS OF
GEORGE SHERSTON 11 (Literary Guild Edition 1937).
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instead models of a highly stylized process. This is the ultimate
failing of existing Chapter 11 theory.
My point is not to argue that theory should never begin with
simplified models. Clearly, some degree of abstraction is needed in
any theory, and key insights are often gained from examining
certain elements of a theory in the isolation provided by a
simplified model. The difficulty arises when the simplified model
can not be translated in a way that connects the model to a more
complex reality.
Any proposed change to a complex system must come from an
understanding of how that system works. At present, Chapter 11
theory instead comes from an unstated belief that a new reality can
be imposed from above, without regard for the preexisting reality.
In this light, it is hardly surprising that Chapter 11 theory has failed.

